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In this study we use a survey data on 398 Finnish manufacturing firms for the years 2002 
and 2005 to empirically explore whether and which organizational factors explain why 
certain  firms  produce  larger  innovative  research  output  than  others,  and  whether  the 
incentives to innovate that certain organizational practices generate differ between small 
and  large  firms,  and  between  those  firms  that  are  operating  in  low-tech  and  high-tech 
industries. 
Our study indicates that there appear to be vast differences in the organizational practices 
leading to more innovation both between small and large firms, and between the firms that 
operate in high- and low-tech industries. While innovation in small firms benefits from the 
practices that enhance employee participation in decision-making, large firms that have 
more decentralized decision-making patterns do not seem to innovate more than those with 
a more bureaucratic decision-making structure.  
The most efficient incentive for innovation among the sampled companies seems to be the 
ownership of a firm’s stocks by employees and/or managers. Performance based wages 
also  relates  positively  to  innovation,  but  only  when  it  is  combined  with  a  systematic 




JEL codes: L25, M54, O31 
Key words: Innovation, firm size, organizational practices, HRM practices 
                                                 
* Heli Koski, ETLA, Helsinki and Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Pisa. E-mail: heli.koski@etla.fi 
** Luigi Marengo, Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Pisa. E-mail: l.marengo@sssup.it 
*** Iiro Mäkinen, ETLA, Helsinki and Stanford University. E-mail: makinen@stanford.edu. 
¨ The authors would like to thank Mikko Mäkinen for kindly letting us to use his survey data. We gratefully 
acknowledge the support to the research by the European Union, NEST Project CO3, Common Complex Collective 
Phenomena in Statistical Mechanics, Society, Economics, and Biology; and the 6th FP Network of Excellence DIME, 
Dynamics of Institutions and Markets in Europe. This paper is also part of a research program "Finland in Global 
Competition", financed by the Technology Industries of Finland Centennial Foundation, and the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes).   3 
1. Introduction 
What makes some firms more innovative than others? This fundamental question in the 
economics  and  management  of  innovation  has  been  tackled  by  different  angles, 
investigating the effects of industry, technology, size and, more recently, organization and 
management. Size has been one of the first and foremost variables to be considered, also 
because size, and in particular the distinction between small and large firms, appears to 
capture many effects of the other explanatory variables. Small and large firms are indeed 
likely to be different in many respects such as in regard to their market power, use of 
technologies, access to financial sources, organizational structures, incentive systems, and 
management styles.  
However theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on how all these differences should 
impinge on differential rates of innovation are far from being conclusive. Even Schumpeter 
himself,  as  well  known,  supported  opposite  conclusions  during  his  life.  In  his  earlier 
writings  he  argued  that  small  firms  are  likely  to  be  more  innovative  as  they  are  less 
bureaucratic, but later he stated that innovation increases more than disproportionately with 
firm size and that larger firms with more market power tend to innovate more than the 
smaller ones. 
On empirical grounds, the claim that small firms contribute to technological change by 
producing  disproportionate  share  of  innovations,  relative  to  their  R&D  spending,  has 
gained  mixed  support  (see,  e.g.,  Symeonidis,  1996;  Martinez-Ros  and  Labeage,  2002). 
Typically, empirical investigations have focused on the relationship between innovation 
output and firm size but they have not explicitly considered the underlying reasons for why 
the firm size matters. Our study aims at shedding light on the organizational mechanisms 
that  produce  differences  in  the  firms’  innovation  performance.  We  empirically  explore   4 
whether  and  which  organizational  factors  explain  why  certain  firms  produce  larger 
innovative research output than others, and whether the incentives to innovate that certain 
organizational  practices  generate  differ  between  the  small  and  medium  size  enterprises 
(SME) and large firms, and between those firms that are operating in low-tech and high-
tech industries. 
A  relatively  new  but  quickly  growing  literature  tries  to  collect  and  elaborate  micro 
evidence, at the firm or plant level, on managerial practices, organizational structures and 
relate  it  to  performance  differentials.  The  issue  is  not  easy  to  tackle  because  both 
managerial  practices  and  organizational  structures  are  vaguely  defined  notions,  hard  to 
pinpoint precisely and even harder to measure. Among the many problems of definition 
and  measurement  are  the  inherently  qualitative,  subjective,  and  ambiguous  nature  of 
practices and structures, the often substantial differences between “formal” and “informal” 
practices and structures, whereby the real working of the organization might rely mainly on 
the latter and these might not be clearly known even to workers and managers themselves. 
Finally, even when clearly defined these notions are hard to measure and quantify and 
usually the observer can only state whether a practice or structural feature exist or not 
without being able to measure the intensity and extent of application. 
There  are  very  few  empirical  studies  that  cast  light  on  the  relationship  between  firm 
organization  and  innovation,  and  particularly  on  the  question  of  which  organizational 
factors such as employee participation in decision-making, different management control 
mechanisms and performance based reward systems affect the innovation performance of 
the companies.
1 Rogers (1999) finds, using a sample of 698 Australian firms from the years 
1990 and 1995, that better employee-management communications is positively related to 
                                                 
1 On a slightly different line of enquiry, a group of works concentrate on studying the consequences of Human Resource 
Management practices and in particular on incentive pay and workforce participation in decision making and in the 
distribution of profits. Ichniowski et al. (1997) conduct a direct micro study of the consequences of HRM adoption in a 
specific production process in 26 US steel plants and find that the adoption of a system of HRM practices considerably 
raises labour productivity, whereas single practices in isolation do not have any significant effect   5 
innovative changes in the workplace. Laursen and Foss (2003) use survey data from 1900 
Danish firms to investigate the relationship between different human resource management 
practices and innovation. Their study indicates that performance related pay and internal 
training  positively  relate  to  innovation,  as  well  as  complementary  implementation  of 
various HRM practices. The survey data analysis of Zoghi et al. (2007) suggests that the 
decentralized  decision-making,  information-sharing  programs  and  incentive  pay  plans 
relate positively to the likelihood that an establishment introduces an innovation. 
Closely  related  to  our  study  is  the  stream  of  literature  studying  firm  organization  and 
productivity.  Jones  et  al.  (2008),  whose  survey  data  we  use  in  the  present  study,  find 
support for the positive relationship between HRM practices and productivity at the firm 
level. Their study indicates though that the use of consultative committee and profit sharing 
schemes are the only HRM practices that relate positively and significantly to a firm’s 
productivity. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) report results of a survey of 732 business 
firms in US, UK, France and Germany on the adoption of some broadly defined managerial 
practices.
2 Their study finds a wide dispersion of managerial practices and evidence that 
the adoption of best practices is linked to higher performance measures, e.g., in terms of a 
firm’s productivity  and profitability. Also Black and  Lynch (2001) find that workplace 
practices do matter for the firm performance when measured by profits and productivity, 
and, more importantly, they find that it is not the mere adoption of a workplace practice but 
rather  its  actual  implementation  within  the  establishment  that  is  associated  with  higher 
productivity.  For  example,  use  of  total  quality  management  (TQM)  system  has  an 
insignificant or negative effect on productivity unless its adoption is combined with a high 
proportion of workers meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues.  
                                                 
2 Firms were interviewed on the adoption, reasons thereof and importance of some managerial practices. Questions 
were grouped into 18 issues, concerned with such practices as modern manufacturing, performance tracking and 
monitoring, targets, employees’ incentives, human capital management. For all these 18 groups a “best practice” was 
defined by the authors and scores were given from 1 to 5 as indicators of the degree of adoption of such best practices.   6 
Kato and Morishima (2002) report the first results for Japanese manufacturing firms on the 
productivity  effects  of  clusters  of  employee  participation  practices.  In  their  study,  they 
merged firm financial statement data with the HRM survey data on JLMCs (join labor-
management  committees),  SFCs  (shop-floor  committees),  ESOPs  (employee  stock 
ownership plans) and PSs (profit-sharing schemes). The key finding is that moving from 
the traditional system of no HRM practices to a highly participatory cluster of HRMs will 
lead to a significant 8-9 percent increase in productivity. Their findings also suggest that 
the goal-alignment process needs to be supported both by direct methods (i.e. employee 
financial participation) and indirect ones (i.e. employee participation in decision-making). 
Conyon and Freeman (2004) examine the use and consequences of shared compensation 
schemes in a sample of UK workplaces and firms in the 1990s. They find that shared 
compensation  practices  are  substantial  and  are  growing  in  the  UK;  more  than  half  of 
workplaces have some form of shared compensation scheme. In addition, those firms and 
workplaces  with  such  compensation  plans  are  more  likely  to  establish  formal 
communication and consultation channels with workers and also tend to outperform other 
firms. In part, according to Conyon and Freeman, the growth of the practices in the UK can 
be attributed to government policies that introduced tax incentives to encourage shared 
compensation plans in an attempt to enhance firm productivity. Black and Lynch (2004) 
study how US manufacturing workers fare when firms adopt high-performance workplace 
practices (HPWPs) such as employee involvement programs, job rotation, self-managed 
teams,  company-provided  training,  and  incentive-based  compensation  plans.  They  find 
evidence  that  HPWPs  benefit  workers  economically;  workers’  wages  are  higher  in  the 
firms that use HPWPs than in more traditionally organized firms.
3  
                                                 
3  However,  these  monetary  gains  do  not  seem  to  be  distributed  evenly  with  employees;  nonproduction 
workers appear to be paid a  wage premium,  whereas compensation  for production  workers seems to be 
unaffected in HPWP establishments. The authors suggest that this is one channel that is linked to an increase 
in within-establishment wage inequality.    7 
Another  closely  related  literature  concentrates  on  the  performance  differences  between 
small  and  large  firms  stemming  from  the  different  management  and  organizational 
characteristics  of  firms  of  considerably  different  size.  Holmström  (1989)  suggests  that 
organizational factors (such as the order of magnitude of bureaucracy and the assignment 
of  tasks  across  individuals  and  organizations)  and  reasons  related  to  capital  market 
monitoring rather than purely the firm size as such may explain why the small firms tend to 
produce relatively larger innovative research output the larger ones. Some empirical studies 
that have analyzed the relationship between the firm’s ownership structure and innovation 
suggesting  that  closer  monitoring  is  positively  related  to  innovation  output  (see,  e.g., 
Francis and Smith, 1995). 
Our empirical study contributes to this literature by investigating the relationship between a 
firm’s  organization,  and  particularly  the  firm’s  use  of  different  HRM  practices,  and 
innovation. Our aim is to explore not only what are the organizational determinants of 
innovation but also whether the relationship between organizational factors and innovation 
differs between small and large firms, and between the firms operating on high-tech or low-
tech  sectors.  We  use  survey  data  collected  via  telephone  interviews  from  the  Finnish 
manufacturing  firms  employing  50  or  more  employees  in  Statistics  Finland’s  business 
register in September 2005 (i.e. TOL 2002 categories 15-37, based on SIC/NACE 2002 
classification). The data were collected from 398 firms, covering about 38% of the total 
population of 1,054 firms.
4 Jones et al (2008), using the same data, show that the sampled 
manufacturing firms represent well the total population of the Finnish manufacturing firms 
in  terms  of  industry  and  size.  The  survey  data  was  combined  with  the  Asiakastieto
5 
financial data concerning the sampled firms in 2002 and 2005, and with the data on the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
4 See Jones et al. (2008) for a detailed description of the data collection procedure. 
5  Asiakastieto is a Finnish company that collects, maintains and sells firm-specific financial and credit information. 
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firms’ patent applications we obtained from the database of National Board of Patents and 
Registration of Finland. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  theoretical  arguments  on  the 
relationship between firm size, organization and innovation, and formulates hypotheses for 
the empirical analysis. It also introduces the explanatory variables of the estimated model. 
Section 3 reports our empirical findings. Section 4 presents some conclusive comments. 
 
2. Firm size, organization and innovation 
We already summarized the Schumpeterian arguments on the relationship between a firm’s 
innovation capacity and its size. Industrial organization theory further suggests that the 
strategically different positions of small and large firms affect their innovation behavior. 
Large incumbent companies have a smaller incentive to invest in producing radically new 
technologies as new technologies may cannibalize their profit streams arising from old 
technologies, whereas the small markets entrants have no profits to loose (see Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1982). 
Organizational  economics  provides  different  arguments  for  the  underlying  reasons  why 
firm size may matter in the production of innovations. For instance, as already mentioned, 
Holmström (1989) argues that large firms’ different internal organization and relation to 
the  capital  markets  may  make  them  differ  from  the  smaller  firms  in  their  innovation 
activities and performance. There are still quite few empirical studies shedding light on the 
relationship between firm organization and innovation, and particularly to what extent the 
organizational  factors  such  as  employee  participation  in  decision-making,  different 
management  control mechanisms and the performance based  reward systems affect the 
innovation performance of the companies.    9 
According to the employee creativity literature, bureaucratic, control-oriented management 
giving very little chances to the employees to participate into decision-making in a firm is 
likely to hamper employee creativity and creation of innovations (see, e.g., Redmond et al., 
1993). In bureaucratic organizations with centralized decision making, the acceptance of 
risky R&D projects is likely to involve a greater number of decision making layers and 
especially  if  consensus  is  required  among  multiple  parties,  the  implementation  of 
innovative  projects  becomes  more  complicated  and  time-taking.  The  argument  was 
suggested  in  general  abstract  terms  by  Sah  and  Stiglitz  (1986)  who  model  simple 
organizations of individual agents who must evaluate projects, having a limited ability to 
do so. Agents may incur into two types of errors: approve a bad project or reject a good 
project and the aggregate error is analyzed for different organizational arrangements. In 
particular, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) compare basic hierarchical and decentralized structures 
and show that the former reject more projects (including good ones) than the latter, while 
the latter accept more projects (including bad ones) than the former. In the presence of a 
stream  of  risky  innovative  projects  an  increase  of  hierarchical  layers  should  therefore 
decrease the acceptance rate. Innovative projects may get delayed and particularly those 
generating exceptional or radical innovations totally rejected during the process.  
Organizational structures that decentralize decision making by employing different modes 
of practices that increase employees’ participation in decision-making such as autonomous 
work teams and employee-involved councils at the firm level encourage teamwork among 
employees and share and exchange of innovative ideas. The frequency of communication 
between the management and employees and the employees direct involvement in the firm-
level decision-making are also likely to facilitate the exchange of information and, while 
affecting  the  relationships  of  the  employees  to  the  management,  lower  the  barriers  to 
acknowledge and further develop innovative solutions originating from the employees.    10 
We  measure  employee  participation  by  two  variables,  one  of  which  (variable 
EMPL_PARTICIP) captures the adoption of different formal organizational practices that 
allow employee participation to decision-making at the firm-level, while the other (variable 
EMPL_PARTICIP_FREQ) measures the frequency or the order of magnitude of employee 
participation  in  the  firm’s  decision-making.  The  variable  EMPL_PARTICIP  is  built  by 
summing  up  the  five  different  dummy  variable  that  get  value  1,  respectively,  if  i)  the 
employees have a representative(s) in the firm’s board, ii) the company has a firm-level 
advisory  board  between  employees  and  management,  iii)  the  firm  uses  a  suggestion 
scheme,  iv)  the  firms  has  autonomic  teams,  and  v)  regular  developing  discussions  are 
organized  between  the  managers  and  the  employees;  and  0  otherwise.  The  variable 
EMPL_PARTICIP_FREQ  is  the  sum  of  two  variables,  the  number  of  developing 
discussions held between managers and employees per year and the number of firm-level 
decisions that involve joint planning or joint decision making with the employees. Such 
decisions  are  grouped  in  the  questionnaire  into  seven  decision  making  categories 
concerning business strategies, major organizational changes such as mergers, adoption of 
new  technologies  or  equipment,  the  reduction  of  the  firm’s  personnel,  work  safety, 
employee education, and the economic incentive mechanisms. 
Bureaucracy is particularly the problem of the large firms (Holmström, 1989). Therefore, 
our hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients of the variables EMPL_PARTICIP and 
EMPL_PARTICIP_FREQ are significant particularly for the sub-sample of the large firms.  
We also explore whether job rotation (the dummy variable JOB_ROTATION) is related to 
patenting, as it is supposed to facilitate knowledge diffusion and thus potentially contribute 
to innovativeness.  
Incentive pay schemes are set to align the incentives of a firm’s employees and its owners, 
and are expected to motivate employees and to produce better performance at the firm   11 
level,  and  thus  they  should  also  encourage  innovation  that  increases  productivity  and 
financial  performance.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  when  managers  are  rewarded 
according  to  the  short-term  performance  of  the  company,  they  may  be  induced  to  act 
myopically and favor such R&D projects that produce faster payback and better observed 
performance  in  the  short  term  (Holmström,  1989).  This  means  that  risky  projects  with 
longer length and more uncertain outcome – i.e. those that are more likely to generate 
radical innovations - are less often undertaken, and innovations tend to be only incremental. 
A wage system based on performance may thus result in a firm’s management to have a 
bias towards short-term profit maximization and reduce their incentives to undertake risky 
R&D projects, resulting in less high quality innovations.
6  
We test the relationship between the implementation of performance based wage system 
and  innovation  by  the  dummy  variable  PERFORM_PAY  that  gets  value  1  if  the  firm 
employs a performance based wage system, and 0 otherwise. We also control for the other 
incentive pay mechanisms: whether a firm uses an option scheme for the management or 
the personnel in general (the dummy variable OPTION_SCHEME) and whether it uses a 
personnel fund (the dummy variable PERSONNEL_FUND). The ownership of a firm’s 
stocks seems like a strong mechanism aligning the employees/management incentives with 
the (other) owner’s of the firm. We control this by the variable STOCK_OWNED_EMPL 
that gets value 1 if the firm’s employees and/or management own the firm’s stocks. 
The two most commonly used incentive pay mechanisms is the performance based wage 
system (64 % of observations) and the ownership of a firm’s stocks (52 % of observations). 
The option scheme and personnel fund were adopted relatively rarely, only in, respectively, 
6 % and 4 % of the cases. Some firms also used multiple incentive pay schemes. Figure 1 
                                                 
6 A rigorous test of this proposition should involve an estimate of the economic value of patents and not simply a patent 
count. The widely recognized tendency of patent offices to liberally grant patents also to innovations of very little value 
and importance (e.g. Bessen, 2008), makes patents a rather bad indicator of high quality innovation. However, an 
estimate of the economic values of the patents of Finnish firms is outside the scope of what we can do in the present 
study (see Bessen (2008) and Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007) for recent examples of such estimates).   12 
shows that there is almost no difference in the average number of used incentive payment 
mechanisms between high-/medium-high-tech and low-/medium-low-tech firms, but there 
is clearly a difference between small and large firms: large firms tend to adopt a greater 
number of incentive payment systems than the smaller ones (about 1.7 against 1.2 in 2005). 
 
- FIGURE 1 HERE - 
 
It seems plausible that the organizational practices that are adopted to foster and control the 
quality  of  a  firm’s  products  and  to  monitor  the  firm’s  performance  may  also  alter  the 
innovation  environment  of  the  firm.  Continuous  emphasis  on  quality  improvements  is 
likely  to  materialize  also  into  a  greater  allocation  of  a  firm’s  resources  to  innovative 
activities fostering quality, and thus positively relates to the firm’s innovation output. We 
measure organizational practices focusing on quality improvements by the dummy variable 
QUALITY that gets value 1 if a firm’s uses quality circles, the total quality management 
(TQM)  system,  or  the  quality  management  system  based  on  ISO9000  standard,  and  0 
otherwise. 
A systematic monitoring of the firm’s performance may give incentives for the employees 
to perform better, particularly if their salary depends on the firm’s performance. When 
monitoring is weak, it is difficult to motivate the employees to undertake risky innovation 
activities.
7 On the other hand, closer monitoring of the firm’s performance may result in a 
short-sighted behavior targeted to short-term profit maximization. Then, monitoring may 
prevent the firm’s management or employees to undertake highly risky activities that less 
likely result in observable output than research and/or development in the areas where the 
                                                 
7 Particularly at the firm’s R&D department close monitoring maybe important as, since innovation is uncertain and 
risky, the failures that are independent from the worker’s efforts become more likely and more tolerance for errors are 
needed especially in the context of the performance based reward system.   13 
improvements  are  incremental  but  visible  in  the  short-term.  The  relationship  between 
closer monitoring and a firm’s innovation performance is thus an empirical question. 
The variable MONITOR takes value 1 if a firm uses balanced scorecard (or other similar 
tools  that  monitor  a  firm’s  performance  against  its  strategic  goals)  or  benchmarking 
comparison
8  to  monitor  the  firm’s  performance,  and  0  otherwise.  As  noted  above,  we 
expect that the mere monitoring may not have substantial impact on a firm’s performance 
but  when  combined  with  the  economic  incentives  for  workers  via  performance  based 
wages,  we  should  observe  significant  performance  implications.  The  dummy  variable 
MONITOR_PERF_PAY captures the organizational practices combining the performance 
based  wage  system  and  monitoring  firm  performance  using  balanced  scorecard  or 
benchmarking  comparison  and  further  reporting  the  performance  outcome  to  the 
employees. 
Holmström (1989) further suggests that the concern for reputation in the capital markets 
may  induce  managers  to  act  more  cautiously  and  not  to  undertake  risky  projects. 
Continuous assessment of the firm’s stock market performance may thus have negative 
long-run  effects  on  innovation.  We  control  the  firm’s  reputation  by  the  variable 
REPUTATION that get values from 0 to 6 according to the debt rating class of the firm - 
assigned  by  the  leading  Finnish  rating  company  Asiakastieto  -  from,  respectively, 
“poor”=C  to  “excellent”=AAA.  These  rating  assessments  capture  the  firm’s  financial 
strength, and are commonly used by the investors to evaluate the financial performance and 
future  prospects  of  the  companies.  We  assume  that  the  higher  debt  rating  class  means 
greater financial reputation among the investors, and thus the variable REPUTATION is 
negatively related to the number of applied patents. 
                                                 
8 Benchmarking comparison means that a firm collects quantitative and qualitative data from its practices and 
performance, and compares them against other similar (in terms of, e.g., size and industry) firms, typically those 
applying “best practices” in the industry.   14 
Overall, if the implications of organizational economics are valid, we should observe that 
the  above  discussed  variables  explain  statistically  significant  variation  in  the  firm’s 
innovation  output.  Also,  if  these  variables  account  for  some  variation  that  is  typically 
captured by a firm size variable in the empirical estimations, we should observe that firm 
size  has  significantly  lower  effect  on  innovation  when  the  organizational  factors  are 
included into the estimated model. Thus, the estimated coefficient of the firm size variable 
and  its  significance  should  decrease  when  the  organizational  factors  are  added  to  the 
model. To test this hypothesis, we first estimate the models for the patent counts without 
the  organizational  explanatory  variables  and  then  compare  the  estimates  to  the  ones 
obtained when these variables are included. 
Control variables: 
Furthermore,  we  control  for  various  factors  that  may  account  for  the  variation  in  the 
innovation  output  of  the  firms.  First,  for  some  firms  the  creation  and  launch  of  new 
innovative products forms a more important part of their competitive strategy, and they 
invest more in the development of innovations. We don’t have information on the firms’ 
R&D expenditures but we can distinguish firms focusing more on innovation creation than 
others by the variable INNOVATIVE_PRODUCTS that gets value 1 if innovative products 
are the most important competitive means of the main product of a firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Second, the ownership structure of a firm may also matter: individual- or family-owned 
firms may differ in their innovation behavior from others (see, e.g., Gudmundson et al., 
2003). The dummy variable FAMILY-OWNED distinguishes companies that are owned by 
an  individual  or  family  from  others.  Family-owned  firms  are  clearly  smaller  than  the 
others; about 85% of them are SMEs, while the correspondent percentage of SMEs is 70 
among the other firms.   15 
We also control for the births of new firms and the deaths of incumbents by means of the 
variables ENTRY and EXIT that measure the logarithm of the number of firms entering 
and exiting, respectively, the industry relative to the total number of the firms in a firm’s 
industry  using  the  2-digit  standard  industrial  classification  (SIC).  The  entry  and  exit 
dynamics relates to technological change in the industry, the emergence of successful new 
firms and innovations and the collapse of the old, nonviable ones. For the incumbent firms, 
more industrial turbulence is likely to mean more competitive pressures to generate both 
cost-saving process innovations and the market expanding product innovations. 
As the firms’ propensity to patent varies substantially between different industries, we use 
dummy variables to control for a firm’s industry (at the 2-digit level). 
 
3. Empirical estimations 
Our empirical analysis aims at explaining variation in the number of patent applications the 
sampled firms have filed in Finland in 2002 and 2005. We are particularly interested in 
whether the innovation dynamics differs between the small-medium and large firms
9, and 
whether  different  organizational  practices  (especially  practices  of  so-called  Human 
Resource Management) create a fruitful environment for innovation among the firms in 
high-/medium-high-tech  and/or  low-/medium-low-tech  industries  (see  Annex  1  for  a 
detailed description of what we mean by high- and low- high-/medium-high-tech and low-
/medium-low-tech industries). Figure 2 shows that large firms file, obviously, more patent 
applications than other firms, and that the average number of patents filed by firms in high- 
and medium-high-technology industries is also higher than the sample average. Whether 
and how these observed differences in the firms’ patenting behavior relate to their use of 
                                                 
9 We use the EU definition of SME and large firms: we define a company to be large if it employs at least 250 
employees, and otherwise small or medium sized.   16 
different organizational practices is an empirical question that the below reported analysis 
aims shedding light on. 
 
- FIGURE 2 HERE - 
 
We estimated the negative binomial regression model for the number of patents a firm has 
applied for in Finland in 2002 and 2005 using the whole sample and the different sub-
groups of firms
10 to explore the relationship between the firm size, organizational factors 
and innovation. The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Tables 2-4 present the estimation results of the models. 
The estimated coefficient of the firm size variable is positive and statistically significant in 
all  the  estimated  equations.  When  we  add  the  organizational  factors  to  the  estimated 
equations, the size variable remains statistically significant but its estimated coefficient is 
lower  and  has  less  statistical  significance  than  when  the  organizational  variables  are 
excluded from the estimated equation. Thus, a part of the variation in firms’ innovation 
performance that is believed to relate to the firm size, when the organizational factors are 
ignored, actually relates to the different organizational practices and arrangements of the 
small and large firms. 
The  estimated  model  for  all  firms  indicates  that  the  order  of  magnitude  of  employee 
participation in a firm’s decision-making relates positively to its innovation output. Further 
estimations  among  the  sub-samples  of  the  data,  however,  show  that  the  variable 
EMPL_PARTICIP_FREQ is positively and significantly related to innovation only among 
the SMEs, and particularly among the high- and medium-high-tech SMEs, while in the 
estimations  among  the  low-  and  medium-low-tech  companies  the  variable  is  not 
                                                 
10 Among the sample of large firms, we could not estimate separate models for the low- and high-technology groups.   17 
statistically significant.  This empirical result hints that the decentralization of decision-
making power benefits much more high-tech companies than those functioning in low-tech 
industries.  This  finding  is  not  surprising  as  often  high-technology  SMEs  face  an 
environment in which circumstances tend to change fast, requiring fast adaptation, and 
successful firms launch new products frequently. We do find, however, that the low- and 
medium-low-tech  SMEs  that  have  adopted  a  higher  number  of  different  formal 
organizational  practices  allowing  the  employees  to  participate  into  a  firm’s  decision-
making tend to file more patent applications than other low tech SMEs.  
Among the large firms, the two variables measuring employee participation in the firm’s 
decision making do not appear statistically significant. This is opposite to our hypothesis 
that  particularly  the  (bureaucratic-by-nature)  large  firms  should  benefit  from  the 
decentralization of the decision making. Consistently with this idea, the descriptive analysis 
of our data shows that the large firms adopt, on average, a higher number of different 
formal organizational practices that allow employee participation to decision-making at the 
firm-level than the smaller ones. The t-test confirms that this difference is also statistically 
significant. The average frequency or order of magnitude of employee participation in a 
firm’s decision making does not, instead, differ significantly between the SMEs and large 
firms.  
We also find that among the high- and medium-high-tech and the large firms, the firm’s 
stock  market  performance  positively  relates  to  its  innovation  performance,  and  it  other 
estimated  equations  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  variable  REPUTATION  is  not 
statistically  significant.  These  empirical  findings  do  not  provide  any  evidence  that 
monitoring  arising  from  the  stock  market  would  generate  such  short-term  profit 
maximization of a firm’s managers that has detrimental influence on innovation. It rather 
seems likely that the stock market performance of the high-tech and large firm’s that patent   18 
more  than  average,  perform  better  than  the  average  companies  due  to  their  greater 
innovativeness which is materialized as a greater number of patents. This finding is also in 
line with the evidence that in the high-tech industries, in which the firms’ success is often 
driven by innovation, patenting is used as (positive) signal of firm performance for the 
financial markets. 
The incentive pay mechanisms do matter as well
11: the variable STOCK_OWNED_EMPL 
is  positively  and  statistically  related  to  a  firm’s  innovation  performance  in  all  of  the 
estimated equations. Also, it seems that generally the adoption of performance based wages 
combined  with  performance  monitoring  enhances  innovation,  while  performance 
monitoring alone is negatively related to the innovation output. The estimated coefficient of 
the variable MONITOR_PERFORM_PAY is greater in the estimations for the high- and 
medium-high-tech firms than among the low- and medium-low-tech firms. This probably 
relates to the different performance criteria that the high-tech and low-tech firms tie to the 
performance based wages. The study of Balkin et al. (2000) finds that in high-tech firms, 
the CEO compensation is directly related to innovation, while such a relationship between 
CEO compensation and innovation does not exist in low-tech firms. When performance 
based  wages  are  related  to  other  measures  than  innovation,  the  employees  neglect 
innovative activities and, instead, use their resources to such activities that are rewarded. 
We  also  observe  some  clear  differences  between  the  sampled  subgroups  in  the 
effectiveness of the incentive pay systems. The large and the low- and medium-low-tech 
firms seem to benefit from the use of personnel funds, whereas those high- and medium-
high-tech SMEs using personnel funds seems to perform worse in terms of innovation 
                                                 
11 In addition to the individual incentive pay mechanisms, we were also interested in whether complementarities matter 
in their use. In other words, does the implementation of various different incentive payment systems affect firm’s 
performance? To investigate this question, we experimented with the variable capturing the number of different 
incentive payment systems used by the firm. This variable, however, was not statistically significant in the estimated 
equations.   19 
output than others. Also, those low-tech SMEs that have adopted an option scheme appear 
to be inferior innovators compared to the other low-tech companies.  
Among all estimated subgroups, except the low- and medium-low-tech SMEs, the firms 
that have reported that innovative products are the most important competitive means of 
their  main  product  tend  to  patent  more  than  other  firms.  The  formal  organizational 
practices concentrating on quality seem, however, to have less importance. Only among the 
large firms, the adoption of the organizational practices focusing on the quality of a firm’s 
products seems to create a more fruitful innovation environment.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Our  empirical  exploration  among  the  Finnish  manufacturing  firms  indicates  that  firm 
organization and use of different HRM practices influences the innovation output of a firm. 
Interestingly, we find that firm size explains less variation in a firm’s innovation output 
when organizational factors are included to the empirical analysis. When organizational 
factors are ignored, a part of the variation in the dependent innovation variable captured by 
the firm’s size arises from the use of different organizational practices of the small and 
large firms.  
Our finding on the significant positive relationship between the use of economic incentive 
mechanisms and innovation is consistent with the (few) previous empirical studies on the 
topic. Our empirical exploration sheds further light on the issue by showing that the type of 
incentive-based compensation mechanism matters as well. The most efficient incentive-
based compensation means encouraging innovation among the sampled companies seems 
to be the ownership of a firm’s stocks by the employees and/or managers. It seems that the 
ownership of a firm efficiently aligns incentives of the employees/managers and the (other) 
owners’  of  the  firm,  and  creates  a  favorable  ground  for  innovative  activities.  The   20 
performance based wages also enhances innovation, but only when it is combined with a 
systematic monitoring of the firm’s performance.  
Our study further indicates that one size does not fit all when it comes to the selection of 
organizational  practices  creating  a  business  environment  that  is  fruitful  for  innovation. 
There are vast differences in the organizational practices leading to more innovation both 
between the small and large firms, and between the firms that are operating in high- and 
low-tech industries. While innovation in the small firms tends to benefit from the practices 
that enhance employee participation in decision-making, the large firms that have more 
decentralized  decision-making  patterns  do  not  seem  to  perform  better  in  terms  of 
innovation than those with a more bureaucratic decision-making structure. It is likely that 
this finding relates to the different organization of innovation in the large and small firms. 
Large  firms  tend  to  have  a  more  bureaucratic  structure,  with  a  greater  number  of 
organizational levels, and they also more often have a separate R&D department than the 
smaller firms. Thus, the employees’ greater involvement into decision-making at the firm-
level may not generate such exchange of information and knowledge that would benefit 
innovation taking place primarily at the firm’s R&D department.  
We find that among the large firms, unlike among the SMEs, a firm’s adoption of HRM 
practices  focusing  on  quality,  such  as  the  total  quality  management  and  the  quality 
management  based  on  ISO9000  standard,  relates  strongly  and  positively  to  the  firm’s 
innovation  performance.  This  finding  further  emphasizes  differences  between  the 
innovation environments of the small and large firms, and that organizational innovations 
or  use  of  HRM  practices  may  have  different  performance  implications  for  the  firm 
depending on its size.   21 
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Table 1. Description of the explanatory variables 























  16.85  1.30 
Sum of five dummy variables that get value 1, 
respectively, if i) employees have representative(s) 
at firm’s board, ii)  company has a firm-level 
advisory board between employees and the 
management, iii) firm uses the suggestion scheme, 
iv)  firm has autonomic teams, and v) regular 
developing discussions are organized between 
managers and employees, and 0 otherwise. 
 
EMPL_PARTICIP 
  2.62  1.10 
Sum of two variables: number of developing 
discussions held between managers and employees 
per year and number of firm-level decision 
categories out of seven (decision making 
concerning firm’s business strategies, major 
organizational changes such as mergers, adoption 
of new technologies or equipment, reduction of 
personnel, work safety, employee education, 
economic incentive mechanisms) that require joint 












  4.09  1.87 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm 
uses job rotation, 0 otherwise 
 
JOB_ROTATION 
  0.78  0.41 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm 
uses performance based wage system, and 
0 otherwise.  PERFORM_PAY  0.64  0.48 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm 
uses an option scheme for the total 
management/personnel, 0 otherwise. 
OPTION_SCHEME 
  0.06  0.24 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm 
uses personnel fund, 0 otherwise.  PERSONNEL_FUND  0.04  0.20 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if wage 
system rewards performance at the level 
of individuals, and 0 otherwise.  STOCK_OWNED_EMPL  0.52  0.50 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm uses 
quality circles, total quality management (TQM) 
system, or  quality management system based 
on ISO9000 standard, and 0 otherwise.  QUALITY  0.82  0.38 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm 
uses balanced scorecard (or other similar 
tool)  or  benchmarking  comparison  to 
monitor  the  firm’s  performance,  and  0 
otherwise.  MONITOR  0.72  0.45 
The dummy variable that gets value 1 if 
firm  uses  balanced  scorecard  or 
benchmarking comparison to monitor the 




  0.46  0.50   24 
about the achieved performance, and uses 




Firm’s debt rating class (assigned by the 
leading Finnish rating company 
Asiakastieto): 
Excellent:  AAA = 6 
good+   AA+ = 5 
good   AA = 4 
satisfactory+   A+ = 3 
satisfactory   A = 2 
fair   B = 1 










  81.68  15.58 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if innovative 
products are the most important competitive 
means of firm’s main product, and 0 otherwise. 
INNOVATIVE_PRODUC
TS  0.14  0.35 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 if firm 
is owned by domestic family or 
individual, and 0 otherwise.  FAMILY-OWNED  0.34  0.47 
Log number of firms entering the industry 
relative to total number of firms in firm’s 
industry using the 2-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC).  ENTRY  -2.84  0.24 
Log number of firms exiting the industry 
relative to total number of firms in firm’s 
industry using the 2-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC).  EXIT  -2.88  0.24 
Dummy variable that gets value 1 in case 
of year 2005, and 0 otherwise.  YEAR2005  0.55  0.50 
+ Industry dummies (at the 2-digit level 
using NACE 1.1 industrial classification)       
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Table 2. The estimation results of the negative binomial model for the number of applied  

































































































































































































  0.44  1.07  -0.02  0.24 
Alpha 
  1.56  2.92  1.02  1.27 






  -330.86 
 
-466.56 
-154.55  -165.09   26 
Table 3. The estimation results of the negative binomial model for the number of applied 
patents of the large Finnish manufacturing firms in 2002 and 2005 
 

































































































Lnalpha  0.35   27 
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Table 4. The estimation results of the negative binomial model for the number of applied 





























































































































































+ Industry dummies 
   



















  0.18  -0.77  0.14 
Alpha 
  1.20  0.46  1.15   29 














-85.92  -90.09 
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Figure 1. Number of incentive payment mechanisms in use 
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Figure 2. Number of patent applications filed by the sample firms in Finland, 2002 and 
2005 

















Applications 2005 (mean)  32 
Annex 1. Definition of high-tech and low-tech industries 
We use the following OECD classification to separate “high-tech” (high-technology and 
medium-high-technology)  industrial  sectors  from  the  low-tech  (low-technology  and 
medium-low-technology) ones: 
 
High-technology  NACE Revision 1.1 
Aerospace  35.3 
Computers, office machinery  30 
Electronics-communications  32 
Pharmaceuticals  24.4 
Scientific instruments  33 
     
Medium-high-technology   
Motor vehicles  34 
Electrical machinery  31 
Chemicals  24-24.4 
Other transport equipment  35.2+35.4+35.5 
Non-electrical machinery  29 
     
Medium-low-technology   
Rubber and plastic products  25 
Shipbuilding  35.1 
Other manufacturing  36.2-36.6 
Non-ferrous metals  27.4+27.53/54 
Non-metallic mineral products  26 
Fabricated metal products  28 
Petroleum refining  23 
Ferrous metals  27-27.3+27.51/52 
     
Low-technology   
Paper printing  21+22 
Textile and clothing  17-19 
Food, beverages, and tobacco  15-16 
Wood and furniture  20+36.1 
Manufacturing n.e.  36-37 
 
 
 
 